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GEORGE ELIOT'S MIDDLEMARCH AS A TRANSLATION OF SPINOZA'S 
ETHICS 
By Miriam Henson 
In 1846 John Chapman of Newgate Street published a translation of David Strauss's Das Leben 
Jesu. Although no translator was accredited, this book was the result of two years' arduous 
work by Mary Ann Evans, the woman who would later achieve renown as George Eliot. 
Strauss's presentation of Jesus is that of a historical figure; he denies his divine status, and 
suggests that the miracles written about in the Gospels are mythic in nature. Although Mary 
Ann was distressed by Strauss's destruction of all the 'miraculous and highly improbable' 
elements of the Gospel, she too had, for some time, been unable to regard Jesus as the Son of 
God; after reading Charles Hennell'sAn Enquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity in 1838 
she suffered a loss of faith and ceased her church attendance in 1842.1 The religious and 
scientific climates of the period were changing: by 1842 Mary Ann had read the work of the 
geologist Charles Lyell and, ten years later, Herbert Spencer presented his theory of evolution 
in the Westminster Review under her management; elements of each anticipated Charles 
Darwin's The Origin of Species of 1859. Although the change occurred gradually, the 
increasing secularization of intellectual thought, and the lack of a divinely endorsed role 
model, placed the nature of morality under scrutiny. 
Mary Ann translated two further philosophical texts which could be considered to offer 
alternative systems of morality: Ludwig Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity and Benedict 
de Spinoza's Ethics, both of which reject the idea of a Judaeo-Christian creator god: 
Feuerbach's 'god' is a projected ideal of human nature, whereas Spinoza's equivalent is 
immanent in all substance. Both writers influenced her fiction, but it is especially interesting to 
consider her relationship with Spinoza as she became convinced that a simple translation was 
not sufficient to make his ideas available: 
What is wanted in English is not a translation of Spinoza's works, but a true 
estimation of his life and system. After one has rendered his Latin faithfully 
into English, one feels that there is another yet more difficult process of 
translation for the reader to effect, and that the only mode of making Spinoza 
accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then shut them and give an 
analysis. (Letters, 1,321) 
Hilda M. Hulme believes that she effects this analysis through her literature and that her 
acknowledged masterpiece Middlemarch is such a 'process of translation'.2 It is certainly 
noteworthy that it was the very year Mary Ann finished translating the Ethics that she turned 
to writing fiction. This raises the question of the capabilities of fiction for moral education: is 
it the case that Middlemarch is 'a true estimation' of Spinoza's system of morality, and why did 
Eliot choose to write a novel rather than a philosophical treatise of her own? 
The disappearance of an absolute ethical role model cast doubt over the concept of an objective 
morality external to humanity, or even external to the individual. Spinoza's presentation of 
what we call 'good' and 'evil' is highly subjective: 'there is nothing in a natural state which is 
by common consent good or bad, since every man in a natural state consults his own advantage 
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alone'.3 Eliot's views in Middlemarch resonate with this as she presents a view oflife restricted 
by the ego. Almost all of the characters' greatest failings stem from their inability to see beyond 
the narrow horizon of the self, which is illustrated through the metaphor of the pier-glass: 
Your pier-glass ... will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all 
directions; but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of illumination, 
and lot the scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a fine series of 
concentric circles round that little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are 
going everywhere impartially and it is only your candle which produces the 
flattering illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light falling with an 
exclusive optical selection. These things are a parable. The scratches are 
events, and the candle is the egoism of any person now absent.4 
Although this does not exclude the possibility of objective truth, the subjectivity of experience 
makes it inconceivable that such knowledge could ever be fully discoverable. 
Spinoza states that 'Every thing ... strives to persevere in its existence' (Ethics, p. 100); if this 
is the presiding rule in life then it is difficult to see how such an egotistical world could avoid 
leading to moral depravity through selfishness. Spinoza's explanation as to why this does not 
occur rests on the human faculties of identification and imagination. This is an area in which 
George Eliot regards literature as playing a vital role: her digressive chapter in Adam Bede, 'In 
Which the Story Pauses a Little' , is a fervent appeal for people to relate to their fellow-men: 
'It is these people - amongst whom your life is passed - that it is needful you should tolerate, 
pity, and love' and realistic fiction helps promote this ideal.5 The ability to empathize was a 
quality much prized by Eliot and she believed that orthodox religion needed to be replaced by 
'a more deeply-awing sense of responsibility to man, springing from sympathy with ... the 
difficulty of the human lot' (Letters, V, 31). Spinoza describes the working of empathy: 'From 
the fact that we imagine a being similar to ourselves ... to be affected with some emotion, we 
shall be affected with a like emotion ... therefore we strive to set the being we pity free from 
suffering' (Ethics, pp. 112-13). What is to be cultivated is the ability of the mind to recognize 
another as having desires and sorrows that are similar to, but at the same time separate from, 
one's own. Martha Nussbaum considers the potential, and indeed the necessity, for certain 
kinds of philosophy to be expressed through literature: 
The telling itself - the selection of genre, formal structures, sentences, 
vocabulary, of the whole manner of addressing the reader's sense of life - all 
of this expresses a sense of life and value, a sense of what matters and what 
does not.6 
Eliot's frequent narrative identification with the reader through the use of the pronoun 'we', 
and direct appeals to the reader's compassion by outlining the perspectives of different 
characters, actively encourage the identification and imagination necessary for empathy. 
In spite of this seeming agreement, Eliot and Spinoza's views then diverge. For Spinoza, 
'Compassion in a man who lives according to reason, is in itself evil and useless ... the good 
which we do ... we desire to so solely in obedience to the dictate of reason' (Ethics, pp. 190-
91). For Eliot, conversely, feeling is imperative, and altruism that is purely academic or that 
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originates from a sense of duty but no affection is not seen as desirable; both Casaubon's 
treatment of Will and Bulstrode's attempts to make amends are portrayed in this way, and it is 
significant that Will eventually refuses to accept either man's offer. Eliot does agree with 
Spinoza that reason is of vital importance, although 'reason' for Eliot equates to a more general 
intellectual self-awareness than Spinoza's rigorous logic. Indeed, a blend of the two is 
necessary: 
'To be a poet is to have ... a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously 
into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowledge .... ' 
'But you leave out the poems,' said Dorothea. (Middlemarch, p. 217) 
The chiastic presentation of 'knowledge' and 'feeling' leads Dorothea to anticipate the lesson 
she will have to learn about life and love: both feeling and consciousness are essential. It is not 
possible to become a poet by virtue of feeling alone: one must also have the intellectual ability 
to enable the writing of poems. Poetry is feeling become self-aware; it requires a functioning 
rational capacity. Bernard Paris refers this to the idea of empathy, and suggests that it has an 
important role to play: 'Consciousness is the primary source of the moral order; it produces that 
awareness of species, of others as different from yet like ourselves, which is the basis of all 
ethical action.'7 Nussbaum similarly considers 'perception', both of one's self and of 'the 
salient features of one's particular situation' to be an essential moral faculty, and describes it as 
being 'built into the very form of the novel as a genre' (Nussbaum, p. 37). Reading a novel, an 
intellectual process in itself, is an ideal means of encouraging rational consideration of 
emotion. 
Certainly, as Spinoza states, an excess of feeling can be dangerous. George Levine suggests 
that in Eliot's work a true knowledge of the world can only be gained through a complete 
annihilation of self: 'clear vision requires selflessness' ,8 and he quotes this passage from 
Middlemarch: 'If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like 
hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies 
on the other side of silence' (Middlemarch, p.189). This is perhaps a perverted empathy: one 
in which identification takes place not with other rational beings, but with life itself and, as a 
result, one's sense of self is entirely absorbed. It indicates that it is possible to empathize too 
much: is this the case with Dorothea? It is certainly one interpretation of her pity for Casaubon, 
and her willingness to devote her life to him. However, Eliot makes it clear that, despite her 
generosity of spirit, Dorothea's view of her marriage is ultimately egocentric: 
[I]t had been easier for her to imagine how she would devote herself to Mr. 
Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom, than to 
conceive with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling ... that 
he had an equivalent centre of self. (Middlemarch, p. 205) 
'Reflection' is fused with 'feeling' in a complex interplay. 'Feeling' is foregrounded: Dorothea 
needs to have a direct emotional connection with Casaubon, rather than a purely academic 
understanding of his 'equivalent centre of self'. The word 'equivalent' is significant, reminding 
us that it is the connection between the two which is important; it is not until Dorothea has a 
proper understanding of her own 'centre of self', for which she needs to cultivate self-
reflection, that she will be able to identify it in others. 
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The desire to avoid selfishness can be so strong that it is easy to underestimate the importance 
of self in empathetic relations and the functioning of society as a whole. Is complete 
selflessness possible? Eliot demonstrates that, no matter how philanthropic one is, one can 
never be altruistically selfless. Most people derive some self-satisfaction from helping others: 
'[Dorothea's] mind had glanced over the possibility, which she would have preferred, of 
finding that her home would be in a parish which had a larger share of the world's misery, so 
that she might have had more active duties in it' (Middlemarch, pp. 76-77). Eliot had first-hand 
experience of another form of self-interested altruism as she devoted her life to caring for her 
father through his last years. She writes: 'We are apt to complain of the weight of duty, but 
when it is taken from us, and we are left at liberty to choose for ourselves, we find that the old 
life was the easier one' (Letters, I, 334). Self-sacrifice is escapism: it allows one to repress 
problematic aspects of one's character, and to avoid the necessity of making difficult choices. 
This is shown through Maggie's plight in The Mill on the Floss. After reading Thomas a 
Kempis she experiences a period of renunciation during which, although she feels herself to be 
satisfied, 'one has a sense of uneasiness in looking at her, - a sense of opposing elements, of 
which a fierce collision is imminent', suggesting that her previous character is dormant rather 
than defeated.9 Her sacrifice enables her to evade making difficult jUdgements, and to dismiss 
the intense emotion that is so problematic: 'Our life is determined for us; and it makes the mind 
very free when we give up wishing, and only think of bearing what is laid upon us, and doing 
what is given us to do' (The Mill on the Floss, p. 314). Even if it were possible entirely to 
subjugate the self to something other, would it be desirable? Altruism requires engagement 
between the self and other, and this can only be fulfilled effectively if a sense of self is 
preserved. David Carroll writes of Dinah in Adam Bede: 'She had been called to minister to 
others, not to have any joys or sorrows of her own (I. 48); but ... this makes reciprocal relations 
impossible. '10 As Mrs Poyser observes, 'if you loved your neighbour no better nor you do 
yourself, Dinah, it's little enough you'd do for him. You'd be thinking he might do well enough 
on a half-empty stomach'; this suggests that healthy self-regard is essential in order to 
empathize fully (Adam Bede, p. 190). 
As we have seen, self-fulfilment can never derive entirely from self-abnegation. As Hulme 
notes, Spinoza places particular emphasis on the importance of self-knowledge: 'It is self-
knowledge, to be gained through the exercise of the human intellect, which will give them 
liberty' (Hulme, p.119). For Spinoza this is the only way to gain partial freedom from the 
determinism of life: 'men believe themselves free solely because they are conscious of their 
actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined' (Ethics, p. 97). The rational 
capacity of thought, including the ability to acknowledge one's physical determinism, is the 
nearest we can get to freedom. Dorothea's freedom comes from her decision to withhold her 
unmitigated compliance with Casaubon's wishes. When Casaubon asks her to promise to 
continue his work she finally, albeit privately, agrees. This is her first complete act of self-
abnegation as it is entirely against her inclination: she neither believes it to be conducive to her 
happiness nor in service of the greater good. However, she is saved from this fate as she 
chooses to consider the decision; rather than unthinkingly submitting she requests time to 
reflect and Casaubon dies before she has a chance to answer. Her further decision not to 
continue the work is problematic, as, having resolved to do so, it might seem that she is 
recoiling from something which she previously considered to be the morally correct action. 
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However this is further indication of the importance of the empathetic relationship between 
people. Dorothea's decision to say yes relies upon her wish to avoid hurting her husband: she 
has discovered that the work has no intrinsic value of its own, and therefore, once she does not 
stand to injure someone's feelings, she does not feel bound to complete it. 
Self-knowledge requires introspection and self-reflection but it cannot be achieved by these 
alone; it necessarily requires interaction with others. The desire to live up to the expectations 
of others is something that Spinoza notes: 'We try to do that which we imagine men will look 
at with pleasure, and on the contrary, we are averse to do that for which we imagine they will 
dislike' (Ethics, p. 85). Whilst obviously true on a superficial level, this does not allow for 
people who like to fly in the face of public opinion as Wtll does, for example. Although he 
does not act in this way simply to be antagonistic he does relish the idea of being 
unconventional, and while Eliot mocks him for his delusions of grandeur, her tone is 
affectionate. However, what Eliot realizes is that this fear of judgement is only present when 
either the subsequent retribution is likely to be severely disadvantageous, or one has a 
connection (through identification or projection of one's own ideals) with the person or 
community passing judgement. This is why, for a long time, Dorothea is so anxious to live up 
to Casaubon's expectations, as he is, at this point, an embodiment of her own ideals. Similarly, 
whilst Rosamond becomes quickly disillusioned with Lydgate, and therefore disregards his 
expectations of her, she is hurt bitterly by the revelation that Will (whom she considers, 
mistakenly, to be something of a soul-mate) thinks badly of her. 
Community expectation may also shape individual consciousness, thus playing a part in 
Spinoza's determinism. As George Levine says of Daniel Deronda, 'the source of both shame 
and fear is the possible exposure to communal observation and consequent judgment' and this 
is true of all Eliot's communities: for example, it is the force which Maggie so resents during 
her childhood and which devastates her adult life (Levine, p. 226). This is unsurprising as 
societal norms and communal judgement impacted so greatly on Eliot's own life following her 
decision to co-habit with Lewes. As a result, much of her fiction is involved with the difficulty 
in reconciling a personal and a communal morality. Many critics have commented that the 
emphasis on the importance of societal opinion and the complex and symbiotic relationship 
between the individual and the community is indicative of Eliot's interest in evolution and the 
organic nature of society. Sally Shuttleworth notes that descriptions of characters are frequently 
presented from the perspectives of others: the fact that Dorothea 'was usually spoken of as 
being remarkably clever', and Mr Brooke 'was held in this part of the county to have 
contracted a too rambling habit of mind', indicates that 'Character cannot be defined apart from 
social opinion, for each individual is only the sum of his, constantly changing, relations with 
the social organism.' Shuttleworth continues, 'Such relativism, however, is more apparent than 
real; it is clearly undercut by the text's claim to offer authoritative judgement.'ll However, 
although the text may indicate that there is an objective truth, this is portrayed as in keeping 
with the pier-glass metaphor: if there is an objective truth it is impossible for the reader to 
locate, limited, as we are, by interpretation. Eliot ironically draws attention to this in her 
comment on the subjectivity of experience: 'The text, whether of prophet or of poet, expands 
for whatever we can put into it, and even his bad grammar is sublime' (Middlemarch, p. 50). 
In any case, the narrator draws back from making any kind of definitive moral judgement about 
the actions of characters. This then encourages interpretation on the part of the reader, and 
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demonstrates one of the key advantages Nussbaum believes fiction offers for moral education: 
'novels are more open-ended, showing the reader what it is to search for the appropriate 
description and why that search matters' (Nussbaum, p. 47). 
In effect, this 'authoritative judgement' of which Shuttleworth speaks is really no more than an 
awareness of the complex inter-relationships of character and community. This creates a 
difficulty: if individuals are determined by society and the morality of society is made up of an 
amalgamation of these individuals' beliefs, then how is society ever to change or develop? Eliot 
makes it clear that anomalous and unconventional individuals are necessary for societal reform, 
through the representation of change instigated by outsiders such as Dorothea, Ladislaw and 
Lydgate. In Darwinian terms, the unusual individuals are the catalysts for wider change, and the 
challenge posed, through conflict and competition, is necessary for progress. However, this 
challenge cannot be revolutionary. Eliot was at the cutting edge of contemporary thought, 
publishing new and challenging philosophical, scientific and theological theories in the 
Westminster Review, but, as Kathryn Hughes notes, 'Social change must come gradually ... 
Revolution, liberation and upheaval were to have no place in Mary Ann's moral world.'12 We 
can see evidence for this in the finale of Middlemarch, in what George Levine describes as 'a 
hymn to gradualism' (Levine, p. 256). 
[T]he effect of [Dorothea's) being on those around her was incalculably 
diffusive: for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric 
acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is 
half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited 
tombs. (p. 795) 
Dorothea Barrett reads the ending much less optimistically: 'the relinquishing of vocation and 
the settling for something un spectacular but comfortable that we feel brooding beneath the 
surface ... suggest an ending neither happy nor tragic, but simply disappointing and 
mundane,.13 However, what looks like a disappointing compromise can often be the synthesis 
of a dialectical process. In her elucidation of Eliot's attitude to social change, Hughes quotes 
from the prospectus for the Westminster Review: 
Sharp scrutiny of 'established creeds and systems' would, it was maintained, 
lead not to their destruction but to their re-emergence in a stronger, refined 
form ... 'opposing systems may in the end prove complements of each other' .14 
This is closely connected to Eliot's insistence that change must come from within, as 
demonstrated, for example, by Will's reluctance to use direct attacks against the systems that he 
wishes to change. In addition, the very positive message presented by the finale is that small 
changes go on to affect the world exponentially. 
In any case, it is the endless process itself which is important. Will is a physical embodiment of 
this process: he is described as being in a state of constant flux. The narrator describes him using 
the vocabulary of change, often evoking water: 'the little ripple in his nose was a preparation 
for metamorphosis' (Middlemarch, p. 203). Shuttleworth also notes this: 'Will ... is concerned 
less with origins than with the vital organic processes of historical growth; he would "prefer not 
to know the sources of the Nile" [(Middlemarch, p. 80))' (Shuttleworth, p. 165). From this we 
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can infer that it is much less important to concern oneself with the origins of morality: more 
significant is what one does with the moral capacities one possesses. This reflects the 
development of Eliot's attitudes towards religion. Despite her loss of faith and her dramatic 
renunciation of the church, as she grew older she developed a tolerance for religion, and 
recognized that it can be a helpful guiding principle. However, it is still the practicality of what 
this can achieve which is important. For Eliot, prayer has no function other than to improve the 
moral nature of the person praying, and it is his or her subsequent actions that are praiseworthy: 
morality is in the process of striving for altruistic ideals, whether or not the ideals themselves 
are true and substantive, or illusory, or projected. This is not to suggest that pursuing pointless 
chimerical ideals is something to be encouraged, rather it allows the possibility that principles 
which cannot be proved by reason may still be essential for the cultivation of an ethical 
attitude. Paris suggests that 'Sentiment saves existence from absurdity, for it hallows and 
sanctifies that which reason finds meaningless or relative. Sentiment moves us to acts of 
goodness, of unselfishness, of reverence, for which reason provides no motivation or 
rationale'; if we came to the conclusion that all our ideals were unobtainable, and stopped 
feeling (despite what we might rationally believe) that some intrinsic meaning exists in the 
world it would be easy to slip into a state of nihilism, solipsism and apathy (Paris, p. 64). So, 
as Paris states: 'Christianity, then, is not the source of the moral order for George Eliot, but, as 
a form of organized experience, it is certainly an important part of the ethical process' (Paris, 
p.63). 
The importance of process for Eliot is in accordance with Spinoza's thoughts about analysis 
and active thought. He states: 'the more [a being] acts the more perfect it is' (Ethics, p. 240), 
and makes a distinction between ideas and other kinds of thoughts: 'an idea involves an 
affirmation or negation ... an idea, since it is a mode of thought, consists neither in the image 
of anything nor in words' (Ethics, pp. 85-86). This is connected to issues of choice and the self-
awareness of our conscious thought which constitutes Spinoza's freedom and self-knowledge. 
The conclusion that arises is that morality is not a list of rules and regulations; it is about the 
active choices that one makes. Gillian Beer notes that in Daniel Deronda 'Mordecai ends by 
claiming that the strongest principle of growth lies in human choice: "The divine principle of 
our race is action, choice, resolved memory. ">15 This can be seen through the emphasis that 
Eliot places on life-changing decisions. Eliot's novels hang entirely around these key points: 
Dorothea's decision not to continue Casaubon's work, Mary's decision not to bum 
Featherstone's will, Gwendolen's decision to marry Grandcourt, Gwendolen's decision to let 
Grandcourt drown, Maggie's decision not to marry Stephen, Tito's decision not to search for 
his father, and so on. 
Hulme argues: 
If George Eliot feels that any correction is necessary in Spinoza's system ... it 
seems likely that she wishes to avoid any apparent overemphasis on the 
importance of 'active thought' ... one whose mind is quite untrained to active 
thought, may yet act rightly through an inspired energy of feeling. (Hulme, 
p. 124) 
However, Hulme confuses 'active thought' with the kinds of reason and intellect which require 
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formal education. Paris describes his own version of 'active thought': 
Lack of intelligence is also an obstacle to sympathy .... A sympathetic feeling 
is one which is excited by the signs of that feeling in another person; 
intelligence, that is, mental vision, is needed to read the signs .... Sympathy 
and vision are both dependent on experience. Unless we have had an 
experience much like that which another person is undergoing, we cannot 
perceive and share the states of feeling signified by that person's behaviour. 
(Paris, p. 68) 
The definitions are slippery; 'intelligence' has nothing to do with the kind of education one 
receives in a schoolroom or from a philosophical treatise, but has everything to do with the 
moral education that comes from 'experience'. The importance of active thought is the reason 
why Eliot chooses to write a novel as an 'analysis' of Spinoza; it is something that cannot be 
achieved by 'words' or 'images' alone but has to involve feeling and self-awareness. Reading 
is a creative process, requiring readers to utilise their imaginative and empathetic faculties, and 
in this respect it develops their capacities for moral judgement. Rather than being didactic, it 
relies on identification in order to gain understanding; as Dorothea says to Celia, 'No, dear, you 
would have to feel with me, else you would never know' (Middlemarch, p. 781). This is 
something that Eliot discusses at length in her essay 'The Natural History of German Life': 
Appeals founded on generalisations and statistics require a sympathy ready-
made ... but a picture of human life such as a great artist can give, surprises 
even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart from 
themselves.16 
In Eliot's opinion, a 'great artist' is one who can use 'words' and 'images' to provoke feeling 
and reflection, thus leading to increased understanding. 
It is in this respect that Eliot and Spinoza have different emphases: Eliot chooses to encourage 
a compassion based on feeling, rather than that exercised by Spinoza's ideal rational man. 
However, even the fact that she challenges some of these issues further fulfils Spinoza's 
system: it is the progress that comes from such challenges that constitutes his ideal of active 
thought. In any case, the importance of feeling is in accordance with Spinoza's system as a 
whole. One of the ways in which Spinoza differed from the Stoical writings of his 
contemporaries is that he allows for its presence, and even necessity. He writes about religion 
and morality: 'Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself; and we do not delight 
in it because we conquer our passions, but because we delight in it, we are able to conquer our 
passions' (Ethics, p. 242). This is why complete selflessness cannot be desirable: enjoyment of 
moral activity is an essential part of wisdom; it is in this way that Eliot gives a 'true estimation' 
of Spinoza's system, and the reason why she writes a novel. Middlemarch achieves what the 
Ethics never can; written in the style of a scientific or mathematical proof, the Ethics may 
advocate feeling, but it does not embody it. It is the way Eliot excites our emotions and makes 
us connect with her characters, combined with the necessary analytical and intellectual attitude 
from the reader, that develops our empathetic capacities and improves our understanding, both 
of ourselves and of our fellow-men with whom we share a common bond of consciousness. 
25 
Notes 
George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters, ed. Gordon S. Haight, 9 vols (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1954-78), 1,206. 
2 Hilda M. Hulme, 'The Language of the Novel: Imagery' in Middlemarch: Critical 
Approaches to the Novel, ed. Barbara Hardy (London: Athlone Press, 1967), pp. 87-124 
(p. 119). 
3 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. George Eliot (Salzburg: Institut fUr Anglistik und 
Amerikanistik, Universitiit Salzburg, 1981), p. 183. 
4 George Eliot, Middlemarch (London: Penguin, 1994; first published 1872), p. 255. 
5 George Eliot, Adam Bede (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; first published 
1859), p. 176. 
6 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), p. 5. Despite the fact that Nussbaum does not question Henry James's 
criticism of George Eliot as a moral writer (p. 45) this view has since been challenged: 
this is competently demonstrated by Rohan Maitzen, who applies Nussbaum's own 
theories to Middlemarch in 'Martha Nussbaum and the Moral Life of Middlemarch' , 
Philosophy and Literature, 30, no. 1 (2006), pp. 190-207. 
7 Bemard Paris, Experiments in life (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), 
p.58. 
8 George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 220. 
9 George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss (London: Penguin, 1979, reprinted 1985; first 
published 1860), pp. 310-11. 
10 David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 78. 
11 Sally Shuttleworth, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make-Believe 
of a Beginning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 152. 
12 Kathryn Hughes, George Eliot: The Last Victorian (London: Fourth Estate, 1998), 
p.78. 
13 Dorothea Barrett, Vocation and Desire: George Eliot's Heroines (London: Routledge, 
1991), p. 126. 
14 Hughes, p. 153, citing George Eliot: Selected Essays, Poems and Other Writings, ed. 
A. S. Byatt and Nicholas Warren (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 3-7. 
15 Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 206, citing 
George Eliot, Daniel Deronda (London: Penguin, 1995; first published 1876), p. 538. 
16 George Eliot, 'The Natural History of German Life', in Selected Critical Writings, ed. 
Rosemary Ashton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 263 
26 
